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Word meaning as function of the composition of its phonemes
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Word meaning as function of the composition of its phonemes
What's the “state of the art” for methodology in syntactic/semantic experimentsDoes the syllable/word ratio in a language determine the number of vowel phonemes it has?How common are the different semantic types of compounds?Online Semantic Relatedness Database?Two sentences with the same meaninginfluence of the structure of a sentence on its semanticsCan 'semantics' replace 'meaning' in these 7 sentences? Why or why not?The Correct Research Methodology To Substantiate If an Expression is an Idiom?Support vector machines for stress predictionHas there been any development or long lasting influence of Leonard Talmy's work?
tl;dr
Linguists like to claim that the mapping from sounds to word meanings is mostly arbitrary. Can you point out research that supports this claim? Specificllay I am looking for hard evidience in form of experimental research and not arm chair linguistics.
Details
Over the years I have repeatedly heard the claim, that the meaning of words is not compositionally computed from its constituent phonemes. In other words, the mapping from sounds to meaning is arbitrary. Whenever somebdy made this claim it obviously was always restricted to atomic words such as house or tree rather than compounds like treehouse. Nobody would argue the meaning of compounds is not derived from its constituent words.
Let me state this more formally, so we understand each other correctly.
(no latex support? really? uff...)
For atomic words (not compounds, not words with productive affixes like un, etc.), there is assumed to be a mapping
f : W_p --> W_s
where W_p denotes the set of phonological representations of the concepts of all words and W_s denotes the set of semantics of all words. The consensus seems to be that this mapping is just a big lookup table that contains only entire atomic words.
We do not assume the alternative function
g : P* --> W_s
where P* denotes the Keleene closure over the set of all phonemes (of a given language).
Let's also require that
forall w in W_p where w = p_0 .. p_n with p_i in P* . f(w) =~ g(p_0 .. p_n)
where =~ means approximately equal under some metric. For example the L2 norm of the difference vector of the vectors of f(w) and g(p_0 .. p_n) if f and g map onto an n-dimensional vector space.
(We could define f(a) =~ g(b) to be true, iff g(b) is among the k closest vectors to f(a) for example)
g in contrast to f internally performs some computation on the sequence n of input phonemes p_0 .. p_n. It does not perform a simple lookup of p_0 .. p_n.
So while f and g are extensionally equivalent (up to the error allowed for =~) they differ intensionally.
However, to this date, nobody claiming that g is not how sequences of sounds are mapped to meaning, but rather that f is how it happens, ever provided any research papers to back this up.
Can you point out to me any papers that investigated this and tried to falsify the assumption that a function like g exists? i.e. that the meaning of atomics words is computed from some composition of its constituent phonemes.
phonology semantics psycholinguistics lexical-semantics cognitive-linguistics
|
show 10 more comments
tl;dr
Linguists like to claim that the mapping from sounds to word meanings is mostly arbitrary. Can you point out research that supports this claim? Specificllay I am looking for hard evidience in form of experimental research and not arm chair linguistics.
Details
Over the years I have repeatedly heard the claim, that the meaning of words is not compositionally computed from its constituent phonemes. In other words, the mapping from sounds to meaning is arbitrary. Whenever somebdy made this claim it obviously was always restricted to atomic words such as house or tree rather than compounds like treehouse. Nobody would argue the meaning of compounds is not derived from its constituent words.
Let me state this more formally, so we understand each other correctly.
(no latex support? really? uff...)
For atomic words (not compounds, not words with productive affixes like un, etc.), there is assumed to be a mapping
f : W_p --> W_s
where W_p denotes the set of phonological representations of the concepts of all words and W_s denotes the set of semantics of all words. The consensus seems to be that this mapping is just a big lookup table that contains only entire atomic words.
We do not assume the alternative function
g : P* --> W_s
where P* denotes the Keleene closure over the set of all phonemes (of a given language).
Let's also require that
forall w in W_p where w = p_0 .. p_n with p_i in P* . f(w) =~ g(p_0 .. p_n)
where =~ means approximately equal under some metric. For example the L2 norm of the difference vector of the vectors of f(w) and g(p_0 .. p_n) if f and g map onto an n-dimensional vector space.
(We could define f(a) =~ g(b) to be true, iff g(b) is among the k closest vectors to f(a) for example)
g in contrast to f internally performs some computation on the sequence n of input phonemes p_0 .. p_n. It does not perform a simple lookup of p_0 .. p_n.
So while f and g are extensionally equivalent (up to the error allowed for =~) they differ intensionally.
However, to this date, nobody claiming that g is not how sequences of sounds are mapped to meaning, but rather that f is how it happens, ever provided any research papers to back this up.
Can you point out to me any papers that investigated this and tried to falsify the assumption that a function like g exists? i.e. that the meaning of atomics words is computed from some composition of its constituent phonemes.
phonology semantics psycholinguistics lexical-semantics cognitive-linguistics
1
You would need to show that transitive closure. You are making a formal argument, but the claim that you attack is not a formal one, the way you present it. I'll just claim that your premises is potentially flawed, until proven otherwise. That's just not how it works. [cont]
– vectory
2 hours ago
1
You are essentially still trying to understand what they said, who said it and in what context (otherwise give a dog a bone). There's no need to reject the claim as you seem to out of fear that it contradicts your intuition, if you don't know what the claim is.
– vectory
1 hour ago
1
I don't understand what you are saying, sorry.
– lo tolmencre
1 hour ago
1
Transitivity and reflexivity are are properties of relations. A phoneme is not a relation. Uness you somehow redefine the linguistic concept of a phoneme or the mathematical concept of a relation, which you didn't, your "transitive and reflexive closure over the set of phonemes" is just pseudo-formal jabber that can't even possibly exist.
– lemontree♦
1 hour ago
1
You may cast your vote for LaTeX formatting here: linguistics.meta.stackexchange.com/questions/509/…
– lemontree♦
1 hour ago
|
show 10 more comments
tl;dr
Linguists like to claim that the mapping from sounds to word meanings is mostly arbitrary. Can you point out research that supports this claim? Specificllay I am looking for hard evidience in form of experimental research and not arm chair linguistics.
Details
Over the years I have repeatedly heard the claim, that the meaning of words is not compositionally computed from its constituent phonemes. In other words, the mapping from sounds to meaning is arbitrary. Whenever somebdy made this claim it obviously was always restricted to atomic words such as house or tree rather than compounds like treehouse. Nobody would argue the meaning of compounds is not derived from its constituent words.
Let me state this more formally, so we understand each other correctly.
(no latex support? really? uff...)
For atomic words (not compounds, not words with productive affixes like un, etc.), there is assumed to be a mapping
f : W_p --> W_s
where W_p denotes the set of phonological representations of the concepts of all words and W_s denotes the set of semantics of all words. The consensus seems to be that this mapping is just a big lookup table that contains only entire atomic words.
We do not assume the alternative function
g : P* --> W_s
where P* denotes the Keleene closure over the set of all phonemes (of a given language).
Let's also require that
forall w in W_p where w = p_0 .. p_n with p_i in P* . f(w) =~ g(p_0 .. p_n)
where =~ means approximately equal under some metric. For example the L2 norm of the difference vector of the vectors of f(w) and g(p_0 .. p_n) if f and g map onto an n-dimensional vector space.
(We could define f(a) =~ g(b) to be true, iff g(b) is among the k closest vectors to f(a) for example)
g in contrast to f internally performs some computation on the sequence n of input phonemes p_0 .. p_n. It does not perform a simple lookup of p_0 .. p_n.
So while f and g are extensionally equivalent (up to the error allowed for =~) they differ intensionally.
However, to this date, nobody claiming that g is not how sequences of sounds are mapped to meaning, but rather that f is how it happens, ever provided any research papers to back this up.
Can you point out to me any papers that investigated this and tried to falsify the assumption that a function like g exists? i.e. that the meaning of atomics words is computed from some composition of its constituent phonemes.
phonology semantics psycholinguistics lexical-semantics cognitive-linguistics
tl;dr
Linguists like to claim that the mapping from sounds to word meanings is mostly arbitrary. Can you point out research that supports this claim? Specificllay I am looking for hard evidience in form of experimental research and not arm chair linguistics.
Details
Over the years I have repeatedly heard the claim, that the meaning of words is not compositionally computed from its constituent phonemes. In other words, the mapping from sounds to meaning is arbitrary. Whenever somebdy made this claim it obviously was always restricted to atomic words such as house or tree rather than compounds like treehouse. Nobody would argue the meaning of compounds is not derived from its constituent words.
Let me state this more formally, so we understand each other correctly.
(no latex support? really? uff...)
For atomic words (not compounds, not words with productive affixes like un, etc.), there is assumed to be a mapping
f : W_p --> W_s
where W_p denotes the set of phonological representations of the concepts of all words and W_s denotes the set of semantics of all words. The consensus seems to be that this mapping is just a big lookup table that contains only entire atomic words.
We do not assume the alternative function
g : P* --> W_s
where P* denotes the Keleene closure over the set of all phonemes (of a given language).
Let's also require that
forall w in W_p where w = p_0 .. p_n with p_i in P* . f(w) =~ g(p_0 .. p_n)
where =~ means approximately equal under some metric. For example the L2 norm of the difference vector of the vectors of f(w) and g(p_0 .. p_n) if f and g map onto an n-dimensional vector space.
(We could define f(a) =~ g(b) to be true, iff g(b) is among the k closest vectors to f(a) for example)
g in contrast to f internally performs some computation on the sequence n of input phonemes p_0 .. p_n. It does not perform a simple lookup of p_0 .. p_n.
So while f and g are extensionally equivalent (up to the error allowed for =~) they differ intensionally.
However, to this date, nobody claiming that g is not how sequences of sounds are mapped to meaning, but rather that f is how it happens, ever provided any research papers to back this up.
Can you point out to me any papers that investigated this and tried to falsify the assumption that a function like g exists? i.e. that the meaning of atomics words is computed from some composition of its constituent phonemes.
phonology semantics psycholinguistics lexical-semantics cognitive-linguistics
phonology semantics psycholinguistics lexical-semantics cognitive-linguistics
edited 1 hour ago
lo tolmencre
asked 5 hours ago
lo tolmencrelo tolmencre
1323
1323
1
You would need to show that transitive closure. You are making a formal argument, but the claim that you attack is not a formal one, the way you present it. I'll just claim that your premises is potentially flawed, until proven otherwise. That's just not how it works. [cont]
– vectory
2 hours ago
1
You are essentially still trying to understand what they said, who said it and in what context (otherwise give a dog a bone). There's no need to reject the claim as you seem to out of fear that it contradicts your intuition, if you don't know what the claim is.
– vectory
1 hour ago
1
I don't understand what you are saying, sorry.
– lo tolmencre
1 hour ago
1
Transitivity and reflexivity are are properties of relations. A phoneme is not a relation. Uness you somehow redefine the linguistic concept of a phoneme or the mathematical concept of a relation, which you didn't, your "transitive and reflexive closure over the set of phonemes" is just pseudo-formal jabber that can't even possibly exist.
– lemontree♦
1 hour ago
1
You may cast your vote for LaTeX formatting here: linguistics.meta.stackexchange.com/questions/509/…
– lemontree♦
1 hour ago
|
show 10 more comments
1
You would need to show that transitive closure. You are making a formal argument, but the claim that you attack is not a formal one, the way you present it. I'll just claim that your premises is potentially flawed, until proven otherwise. That's just not how it works. [cont]
– vectory
2 hours ago
1
You are essentially still trying to understand what they said, who said it and in what context (otherwise give a dog a bone). There's no need to reject the claim as you seem to out of fear that it contradicts your intuition, if you don't know what the claim is.
– vectory
1 hour ago
1
I don't understand what you are saying, sorry.
– lo tolmencre
1 hour ago
1
Transitivity and reflexivity are are properties of relations. A phoneme is not a relation. Uness you somehow redefine the linguistic concept of a phoneme or the mathematical concept of a relation, which you didn't, your "transitive and reflexive closure over the set of phonemes" is just pseudo-formal jabber that can't even possibly exist.
– lemontree♦
1 hour ago
1
You may cast your vote for LaTeX formatting here: linguistics.meta.stackexchange.com/questions/509/…
– lemontree♦
1 hour ago
1
1
You would need to show that transitive closure. You are making a formal argument, but the claim that you attack is not a formal one, the way you present it. I'll just claim that your premises is potentially flawed, until proven otherwise. That's just not how it works. [cont]
– vectory
2 hours ago
You would need to show that transitive closure. You are making a formal argument, but the claim that you attack is not a formal one, the way you present it. I'll just claim that your premises is potentially flawed, until proven otherwise. That's just not how it works. [cont]
– vectory
2 hours ago
1
1
You are essentially still trying to understand what they said, who said it and in what context (otherwise give a dog a bone). There's no need to reject the claim as you seem to out of fear that it contradicts your intuition, if you don't know what the claim is.
– vectory
1 hour ago
You are essentially still trying to understand what they said, who said it and in what context (otherwise give a dog a bone). There's no need to reject the claim as you seem to out of fear that it contradicts your intuition, if you don't know what the claim is.
– vectory
1 hour ago
1
1
I don't understand what you are saying, sorry.
– lo tolmencre
1 hour ago
I don't understand what you are saying, sorry.
– lo tolmencre
1 hour ago
1
1
Transitivity and reflexivity are are properties of relations. A phoneme is not a relation. Uness you somehow redefine the linguistic concept of a phoneme or the mathematical concept of a relation, which you didn't, your "transitive and reflexive closure over the set of phonemes" is just pseudo-formal jabber that can't even possibly exist.
– lemontree♦
1 hour ago
Transitivity and reflexivity are are properties of relations. A phoneme is not a relation. Uness you somehow redefine the linguistic concept of a phoneme or the mathematical concept of a relation, which you didn't, your "transitive and reflexive closure over the set of phonemes" is just pseudo-formal jabber that can't even possibly exist.
– lemontree♦
1 hour ago
1
1
You may cast your vote for LaTeX formatting here: linguistics.meta.stackexchange.com/questions/509/…
– lemontree♦
1 hour ago
You may cast your vote for LaTeX formatting here: linguistics.meta.stackexchange.com/questions/509/…
– lemontree♦
1 hour ago
|
show 10 more comments
3 Answers
3
active
oldest
votes
This is probably not the kind of answer you are looking for, but I guess the following two points would have to be considered as strong indications that meaning is not computed from phonology.
Polysemy (wood: the stuff a tree is made of as well as a collection of trees growing together) and homophony (pear, pair). This implies g is not a function. Also I don't know how the inverse of g works – how do speakers get from meanings to sounds?
What would the existence of a function such as g predict about language change, and how does it correspond to the kinds of changes we actually observe? Note especially the following two cases.
Changes in the phonological structure that are not accompanied by a change in meaning (e.g. metathesis third < OE þridda; cf. three) and vice versa (wicked went from morally bad to excellent). The former is very weird – why would g change in such a fashion that three retains its meaning while the very closely related phonological form that maps to the meaning of the corresponding ordinal changes (with all other words containing r retaining their meaning)? The weirdness of the latter lies in the fact that words that are substrings of a word that changes its meaning (e.g. wick to wicked) do not change along, nor do any other words that stand in a relationship of X : Xed.
Two more armchairy arguments:
Chomsky's question: How would a learner infer g? Looking at, for instance, but, butt, butter, buttress – is there any better strategy than memorization? Any other strategy at all?
Why do competent native speakers with a vocabulary exceeding ten thousand words still need to look up unfamiliar words? And what happens when they look up a word – is g adapted in some manner? Do the meanings of all other words consequently change?
I wanted to comment on the same problem regarding unambiguity of the functions f and g, but I can't argue against a mathematical formula. The target set doesn't have to be flat, the elements of the set don't have to be primitives. The claim in question, and the attacked claim, are both so weakly defined, that they are arbitrary.
– vectory
2 hours ago
Even if g can do complex stuff (e.g. but is a substring of butt but the meanings are as different as they could be) there's still the question: Well, what kind of linguistic changes would we likely observe given g? I have no idea. But the changes we do observe fit the assumption of arbitrariness quite well ("What, we say aks instead of ask know? Okay, cool.").
– David Vogt
2 hours ago
You are right, homophones would make f and g not functions. We can correct that by letting them map to sets of word meanings rather than to individual word meanings. You also assume g to be very precise in its mapping to word meanings. g could be vague, as suggested by my definition of =~. If it is vague enough and the mapping very complicated, cases such as wicked do not necessarily disprove g's existence.
– lo tolmencre
2 hours ago
Why should inferring g be a problem? phonemes could be correlated with co-occuring phonemes relative to word meanings somehow.
– lo tolmencre
2 hours ago
1
1) I look up words frequently, and there are a lot of simplexes among them (as complex words, as you indicated, often have compositional meanings). 2) Wouldn't the detection of the kind of correlations you mention require knowing a vast set of arbitrary sound-meaning-correspondences? 3) wick : wicked in itself would not be a problem, but what if the meaning of one element changes while the meaning of other elements of the form X : Xed stays constant? Does the assumption of sound-meaning-correspondence predict that these kinds of changes happen?
– David Vogt
2 hours ago
|
show 6 more comments
Interestingly, it is so self-evident that the arbitrariness claim is true that nobody has experimentally verified the claim. But it would not be hard to do, if you have access to a captive subject pool. There are many procedures that could be followed, but the basic idea is to take recordings of actual words from various languages, present them (one at a time) to speakers of random languages (take note of what they speak), and have them assign a meaning to the words. Alternatively, give them a set of maybe 5 glosses (in their language), one of which is the correct translation and the others are randomly selected. For instance, a subject is presented with [goahti] and told to choose between "he ate; hut; running; lemur; until". The word is from North Saami and it means "hut". If there is a non-arbitrary sound-meaning relation, speakers (regardless of native language) should do better than chance in selecting the meaning, but if it is arbitrary, non-Saami speakers should perform at chance and Saami speakers should guess correctly very often. (You have to exclude people like me who know some Saami but don't actually speak it, and maybe exclude many Norwegians since it's one of those widely-known Saami words in Norway).
One big problem would be keeping track of crosslinguistically polysemous words. For instance, [moto] apparently means "blades of grass, trunks; falcons" in Japanese, "motorcycle" in various Romance languages, "person" in Lingala, "fire" in various other Bantu languages, "eye" in Tiruray. Also, Mongolian [xɛɮ] "language" counts a lot like "hell" to English speakers; Somali [maðaħ] "head" sounds a lot like "mother" and [naag] "woman" sounds a lot like English "nag". In scoring or setting up the stimuli, you'd need to filter out or somehow control for words of one language that sound similar-enough to words of a subjects language that they think it is a word of their language.
That is probably why nobody has done the experiment.
You are assuming a universal g here though. There could be per language or maybe even per speaker gs. Different languages encode the same concepts differently (with different words). So they might also have their own g that translates phoneme sequences to word meanings, just like they have their own syntax, phonotactics etc.
– lo tolmencre
2 hours ago
add a comment |
The prove for the claim is trivial. Words on the Swadesh list will show little correlation between meaning and phonetics, save for exceptions like mama. If there is a hidden correlation, then because the relation is more complicated.
EDIT: A weaker Argument would be constrained to a single language of a single speaker. I guess that's more or less what you mean. It's not quite clear what you mean, though. phone, word and set of semantics are not well defined as far as I know. That's in essence the same claim as you attack, if, whatever you refered to, was a response to a failed attempt trying to explain meaning from phonetics. Which would be called inductive reasoning, i.e. experience. The smallest constituent, of speech, the phone, ordered in sequences, is not enough to explain meaning, or to learn language.
add a comment |
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This is probably not the kind of answer you are looking for, but I guess the following two points would have to be considered as strong indications that meaning is not computed from phonology.
Polysemy (wood: the stuff a tree is made of as well as a collection of trees growing together) and homophony (pear, pair). This implies g is not a function. Also I don't know how the inverse of g works – how do speakers get from meanings to sounds?
What would the existence of a function such as g predict about language change, and how does it correspond to the kinds of changes we actually observe? Note especially the following two cases.
Changes in the phonological structure that are not accompanied by a change in meaning (e.g. metathesis third < OE þridda; cf. three) and vice versa (wicked went from morally bad to excellent). The former is very weird – why would g change in such a fashion that three retains its meaning while the very closely related phonological form that maps to the meaning of the corresponding ordinal changes (with all other words containing r retaining their meaning)? The weirdness of the latter lies in the fact that words that are substrings of a word that changes its meaning (e.g. wick to wicked) do not change along, nor do any other words that stand in a relationship of X : Xed.
Two more armchairy arguments:
Chomsky's question: How would a learner infer g? Looking at, for instance, but, butt, butter, buttress – is there any better strategy than memorization? Any other strategy at all?
Why do competent native speakers with a vocabulary exceeding ten thousand words still need to look up unfamiliar words? And what happens when they look up a word – is g adapted in some manner? Do the meanings of all other words consequently change?
I wanted to comment on the same problem regarding unambiguity of the functions f and g, but I can't argue against a mathematical formula. The target set doesn't have to be flat, the elements of the set don't have to be primitives. The claim in question, and the attacked claim, are both so weakly defined, that they are arbitrary.
– vectory
2 hours ago
Even if g can do complex stuff (e.g. but is a substring of butt but the meanings are as different as they could be) there's still the question: Well, what kind of linguistic changes would we likely observe given g? I have no idea. But the changes we do observe fit the assumption of arbitrariness quite well ("What, we say aks instead of ask know? Okay, cool.").
– David Vogt
2 hours ago
You are right, homophones would make f and g not functions. We can correct that by letting them map to sets of word meanings rather than to individual word meanings. You also assume g to be very precise in its mapping to word meanings. g could be vague, as suggested by my definition of =~. If it is vague enough and the mapping very complicated, cases such as wicked do not necessarily disprove g's existence.
– lo tolmencre
2 hours ago
Why should inferring g be a problem? phonemes could be correlated with co-occuring phonemes relative to word meanings somehow.
– lo tolmencre
2 hours ago
1
1) I look up words frequently, and there are a lot of simplexes among them (as complex words, as you indicated, often have compositional meanings). 2) Wouldn't the detection of the kind of correlations you mention require knowing a vast set of arbitrary sound-meaning-correspondences? 3) wick : wicked in itself would not be a problem, but what if the meaning of one element changes while the meaning of other elements of the form X : Xed stays constant? Does the assumption of sound-meaning-correspondence predict that these kinds of changes happen?
– David Vogt
2 hours ago
|
show 6 more comments
This is probably not the kind of answer you are looking for, but I guess the following two points would have to be considered as strong indications that meaning is not computed from phonology.
Polysemy (wood: the stuff a tree is made of as well as a collection of trees growing together) and homophony (pear, pair). This implies g is not a function. Also I don't know how the inverse of g works – how do speakers get from meanings to sounds?
What would the existence of a function such as g predict about language change, and how does it correspond to the kinds of changes we actually observe? Note especially the following two cases.
Changes in the phonological structure that are not accompanied by a change in meaning (e.g. metathesis third < OE þridda; cf. three) and vice versa (wicked went from morally bad to excellent). The former is very weird – why would g change in such a fashion that three retains its meaning while the very closely related phonological form that maps to the meaning of the corresponding ordinal changes (with all other words containing r retaining their meaning)? The weirdness of the latter lies in the fact that words that are substrings of a word that changes its meaning (e.g. wick to wicked) do not change along, nor do any other words that stand in a relationship of X : Xed.
Two more armchairy arguments:
Chomsky's question: How would a learner infer g? Looking at, for instance, but, butt, butter, buttress – is there any better strategy than memorization? Any other strategy at all?
Why do competent native speakers with a vocabulary exceeding ten thousand words still need to look up unfamiliar words? And what happens when they look up a word – is g adapted in some manner? Do the meanings of all other words consequently change?
I wanted to comment on the same problem regarding unambiguity of the functions f and g, but I can't argue against a mathematical formula. The target set doesn't have to be flat, the elements of the set don't have to be primitives. The claim in question, and the attacked claim, are both so weakly defined, that they are arbitrary.
– vectory
2 hours ago
Even if g can do complex stuff (e.g. but is a substring of butt but the meanings are as different as they could be) there's still the question: Well, what kind of linguistic changes would we likely observe given g? I have no idea. But the changes we do observe fit the assumption of arbitrariness quite well ("What, we say aks instead of ask know? Okay, cool.").
– David Vogt
2 hours ago
You are right, homophones would make f and g not functions. We can correct that by letting them map to sets of word meanings rather than to individual word meanings. You also assume g to be very precise in its mapping to word meanings. g could be vague, as suggested by my definition of =~. If it is vague enough and the mapping very complicated, cases such as wicked do not necessarily disprove g's existence.
– lo tolmencre
2 hours ago
Why should inferring g be a problem? phonemes could be correlated with co-occuring phonemes relative to word meanings somehow.
– lo tolmencre
2 hours ago
1
1) I look up words frequently, and there are a lot of simplexes among them (as complex words, as you indicated, often have compositional meanings). 2) Wouldn't the detection of the kind of correlations you mention require knowing a vast set of arbitrary sound-meaning-correspondences? 3) wick : wicked in itself would not be a problem, but what if the meaning of one element changes while the meaning of other elements of the form X : Xed stays constant? Does the assumption of sound-meaning-correspondence predict that these kinds of changes happen?
– David Vogt
2 hours ago
|
show 6 more comments
This is probably not the kind of answer you are looking for, but I guess the following two points would have to be considered as strong indications that meaning is not computed from phonology.
Polysemy (wood: the stuff a tree is made of as well as a collection of trees growing together) and homophony (pear, pair). This implies g is not a function. Also I don't know how the inverse of g works – how do speakers get from meanings to sounds?
What would the existence of a function such as g predict about language change, and how does it correspond to the kinds of changes we actually observe? Note especially the following two cases.
Changes in the phonological structure that are not accompanied by a change in meaning (e.g. metathesis third < OE þridda; cf. three) and vice versa (wicked went from morally bad to excellent). The former is very weird – why would g change in such a fashion that three retains its meaning while the very closely related phonological form that maps to the meaning of the corresponding ordinal changes (with all other words containing r retaining their meaning)? The weirdness of the latter lies in the fact that words that are substrings of a word that changes its meaning (e.g. wick to wicked) do not change along, nor do any other words that stand in a relationship of X : Xed.
Two more armchairy arguments:
Chomsky's question: How would a learner infer g? Looking at, for instance, but, butt, butter, buttress – is there any better strategy than memorization? Any other strategy at all?
Why do competent native speakers with a vocabulary exceeding ten thousand words still need to look up unfamiliar words? And what happens when they look up a word – is g adapted in some manner? Do the meanings of all other words consequently change?
This is probably not the kind of answer you are looking for, but I guess the following two points would have to be considered as strong indications that meaning is not computed from phonology.
Polysemy (wood: the stuff a tree is made of as well as a collection of trees growing together) and homophony (pear, pair). This implies g is not a function. Also I don't know how the inverse of g works – how do speakers get from meanings to sounds?
What would the existence of a function such as g predict about language change, and how does it correspond to the kinds of changes we actually observe? Note especially the following two cases.
Changes in the phonological structure that are not accompanied by a change in meaning (e.g. metathesis third < OE þridda; cf. three) and vice versa (wicked went from morally bad to excellent). The former is very weird – why would g change in such a fashion that three retains its meaning while the very closely related phonological form that maps to the meaning of the corresponding ordinal changes (with all other words containing r retaining their meaning)? The weirdness of the latter lies in the fact that words that are substrings of a word that changes its meaning (e.g. wick to wicked) do not change along, nor do any other words that stand in a relationship of X : Xed.
Two more armchairy arguments:
Chomsky's question: How would a learner infer g? Looking at, for instance, but, butt, butter, buttress – is there any better strategy than memorization? Any other strategy at all?
Why do competent native speakers with a vocabulary exceeding ten thousand words still need to look up unfamiliar words? And what happens when they look up a word – is g adapted in some manner? Do the meanings of all other words consequently change?
edited 1 hour ago
answered 3 hours ago
David VogtDavid Vogt
2494
2494
I wanted to comment on the same problem regarding unambiguity of the functions f and g, but I can't argue against a mathematical formula. The target set doesn't have to be flat, the elements of the set don't have to be primitives. The claim in question, and the attacked claim, are both so weakly defined, that they are arbitrary.
– vectory
2 hours ago
Even if g can do complex stuff (e.g. but is a substring of butt but the meanings are as different as they could be) there's still the question: Well, what kind of linguistic changes would we likely observe given g? I have no idea. But the changes we do observe fit the assumption of arbitrariness quite well ("What, we say aks instead of ask know? Okay, cool.").
– David Vogt
2 hours ago
You are right, homophones would make f and g not functions. We can correct that by letting them map to sets of word meanings rather than to individual word meanings. You also assume g to be very precise in its mapping to word meanings. g could be vague, as suggested by my definition of =~. If it is vague enough and the mapping very complicated, cases such as wicked do not necessarily disprove g's existence.
– lo tolmencre
2 hours ago
Why should inferring g be a problem? phonemes could be correlated with co-occuring phonemes relative to word meanings somehow.
– lo tolmencre
2 hours ago
1
1) I look up words frequently, and there are a lot of simplexes among them (as complex words, as you indicated, often have compositional meanings). 2) Wouldn't the detection of the kind of correlations you mention require knowing a vast set of arbitrary sound-meaning-correspondences? 3) wick : wicked in itself would not be a problem, but what if the meaning of one element changes while the meaning of other elements of the form X : Xed stays constant? Does the assumption of sound-meaning-correspondence predict that these kinds of changes happen?
– David Vogt
2 hours ago
|
show 6 more comments
I wanted to comment on the same problem regarding unambiguity of the functions f and g, but I can't argue against a mathematical formula. The target set doesn't have to be flat, the elements of the set don't have to be primitives. The claim in question, and the attacked claim, are both so weakly defined, that they are arbitrary.
– vectory
2 hours ago
Even if g can do complex stuff (e.g. but is a substring of butt but the meanings are as different as they could be) there's still the question: Well, what kind of linguistic changes would we likely observe given g? I have no idea. But the changes we do observe fit the assumption of arbitrariness quite well ("What, we say aks instead of ask know? Okay, cool.").
– David Vogt
2 hours ago
You are right, homophones would make f and g not functions. We can correct that by letting them map to sets of word meanings rather than to individual word meanings. You also assume g to be very precise in its mapping to word meanings. g could be vague, as suggested by my definition of =~. If it is vague enough and the mapping very complicated, cases such as wicked do not necessarily disprove g's existence.
– lo tolmencre
2 hours ago
Why should inferring g be a problem? phonemes could be correlated with co-occuring phonemes relative to word meanings somehow.
– lo tolmencre
2 hours ago
1
1) I look up words frequently, and there are a lot of simplexes among them (as complex words, as you indicated, often have compositional meanings). 2) Wouldn't the detection of the kind of correlations you mention require knowing a vast set of arbitrary sound-meaning-correspondences? 3) wick : wicked in itself would not be a problem, but what if the meaning of one element changes while the meaning of other elements of the form X : Xed stays constant? Does the assumption of sound-meaning-correspondence predict that these kinds of changes happen?
– David Vogt
2 hours ago
I wanted to comment on the same problem regarding unambiguity of the functions f and g, but I can't argue against a mathematical formula. The target set doesn't have to be flat, the elements of the set don't have to be primitives. The claim in question, and the attacked claim, are both so weakly defined, that they are arbitrary.
– vectory
2 hours ago
I wanted to comment on the same problem regarding unambiguity of the functions f and g, but I can't argue against a mathematical formula. The target set doesn't have to be flat, the elements of the set don't have to be primitives. The claim in question, and the attacked claim, are both so weakly defined, that they are arbitrary.
– vectory
2 hours ago
Even if g can do complex stuff (e.g. but is a substring of butt but the meanings are as different as they could be) there's still the question: Well, what kind of linguistic changes would we likely observe given g? I have no idea. But the changes we do observe fit the assumption of arbitrariness quite well ("What, we say aks instead of ask know? Okay, cool.").
– David Vogt
2 hours ago
Even if g can do complex stuff (e.g. but is a substring of butt but the meanings are as different as they could be) there's still the question: Well, what kind of linguistic changes would we likely observe given g? I have no idea. But the changes we do observe fit the assumption of arbitrariness quite well ("What, we say aks instead of ask know? Okay, cool.").
– David Vogt
2 hours ago
You are right, homophones would make f and g not functions. We can correct that by letting them map to sets of word meanings rather than to individual word meanings. You also assume g to be very precise in its mapping to word meanings. g could be vague, as suggested by my definition of =~. If it is vague enough and the mapping very complicated, cases such as wicked do not necessarily disprove g's existence.
– lo tolmencre
2 hours ago
You are right, homophones would make f and g not functions. We can correct that by letting them map to sets of word meanings rather than to individual word meanings. You also assume g to be very precise in its mapping to word meanings. g could be vague, as suggested by my definition of =~. If it is vague enough and the mapping very complicated, cases such as wicked do not necessarily disprove g's existence.
– lo tolmencre
2 hours ago
Why should inferring g be a problem? phonemes could be correlated with co-occuring phonemes relative to word meanings somehow.
– lo tolmencre
2 hours ago
Why should inferring g be a problem? phonemes could be correlated with co-occuring phonemes relative to word meanings somehow.
– lo tolmencre
2 hours ago
1
1
1) I look up words frequently, and there are a lot of simplexes among them (as complex words, as you indicated, often have compositional meanings). 2) Wouldn't the detection of the kind of correlations you mention require knowing a vast set of arbitrary sound-meaning-correspondences? 3) wick : wicked in itself would not be a problem, but what if the meaning of one element changes while the meaning of other elements of the form X : Xed stays constant? Does the assumption of sound-meaning-correspondence predict that these kinds of changes happen?
– David Vogt
2 hours ago
1) I look up words frequently, and there are a lot of simplexes among them (as complex words, as you indicated, often have compositional meanings). 2) Wouldn't the detection of the kind of correlations you mention require knowing a vast set of arbitrary sound-meaning-correspondences? 3) wick : wicked in itself would not be a problem, but what if the meaning of one element changes while the meaning of other elements of the form X : Xed stays constant? Does the assumption of sound-meaning-correspondence predict that these kinds of changes happen?
– David Vogt
2 hours ago
|
show 6 more comments
Interestingly, it is so self-evident that the arbitrariness claim is true that nobody has experimentally verified the claim. But it would not be hard to do, if you have access to a captive subject pool. There are many procedures that could be followed, but the basic idea is to take recordings of actual words from various languages, present them (one at a time) to speakers of random languages (take note of what they speak), and have them assign a meaning to the words. Alternatively, give them a set of maybe 5 glosses (in their language), one of which is the correct translation and the others are randomly selected. For instance, a subject is presented with [goahti] and told to choose between "he ate; hut; running; lemur; until". The word is from North Saami and it means "hut". If there is a non-arbitrary sound-meaning relation, speakers (regardless of native language) should do better than chance in selecting the meaning, but if it is arbitrary, non-Saami speakers should perform at chance and Saami speakers should guess correctly very often. (You have to exclude people like me who know some Saami but don't actually speak it, and maybe exclude many Norwegians since it's one of those widely-known Saami words in Norway).
One big problem would be keeping track of crosslinguistically polysemous words. For instance, [moto] apparently means "blades of grass, trunks; falcons" in Japanese, "motorcycle" in various Romance languages, "person" in Lingala, "fire" in various other Bantu languages, "eye" in Tiruray. Also, Mongolian [xɛɮ] "language" counts a lot like "hell" to English speakers; Somali [maðaħ] "head" sounds a lot like "mother" and [naag] "woman" sounds a lot like English "nag". In scoring or setting up the stimuli, you'd need to filter out or somehow control for words of one language that sound similar-enough to words of a subjects language that they think it is a word of their language.
That is probably why nobody has done the experiment.
You are assuming a universal g here though. There could be per language or maybe even per speaker gs. Different languages encode the same concepts differently (with different words). So they might also have their own g that translates phoneme sequences to word meanings, just like they have their own syntax, phonotactics etc.
– lo tolmencre
2 hours ago
add a comment |
Interestingly, it is so self-evident that the arbitrariness claim is true that nobody has experimentally verified the claim. But it would not be hard to do, if you have access to a captive subject pool. There are many procedures that could be followed, but the basic idea is to take recordings of actual words from various languages, present them (one at a time) to speakers of random languages (take note of what they speak), and have them assign a meaning to the words. Alternatively, give them a set of maybe 5 glosses (in their language), one of which is the correct translation and the others are randomly selected. For instance, a subject is presented with [goahti] and told to choose between "he ate; hut; running; lemur; until". The word is from North Saami and it means "hut". If there is a non-arbitrary sound-meaning relation, speakers (regardless of native language) should do better than chance in selecting the meaning, but if it is arbitrary, non-Saami speakers should perform at chance and Saami speakers should guess correctly very often. (You have to exclude people like me who know some Saami but don't actually speak it, and maybe exclude many Norwegians since it's one of those widely-known Saami words in Norway).
One big problem would be keeping track of crosslinguistically polysemous words. For instance, [moto] apparently means "blades of grass, trunks; falcons" in Japanese, "motorcycle" in various Romance languages, "person" in Lingala, "fire" in various other Bantu languages, "eye" in Tiruray. Also, Mongolian [xɛɮ] "language" counts a lot like "hell" to English speakers; Somali [maðaħ] "head" sounds a lot like "mother" and [naag] "woman" sounds a lot like English "nag". In scoring or setting up the stimuli, you'd need to filter out or somehow control for words of one language that sound similar-enough to words of a subjects language that they think it is a word of their language.
That is probably why nobody has done the experiment.
You are assuming a universal g here though. There could be per language or maybe even per speaker gs. Different languages encode the same concepts differently (with different words). So they might also have their own g that translates phoneme sequences to word meanings, just like they have their own syntax, phonotactics etc.
– lo tolmencre
2 hours ago
add a comment |
Interestingly, it is so self-evident that the arbitrariness claim is true that nobody has experimentally verified the claim. But it would not be hard to do, if you have access to a captive subject pool. There are many procedures that could be followed, but the basic idea is to take recordings of actual words from various languages, present them (one at a time) to speakers of random languages (take note of what they speak), and have them assign a meaning to the words. Alternatively, give them a set of maybe 5 glosses (in their language), one of which is the correct translation and the others are randomly selected. For instance, a subject is presented with [goahti] and told to choose between "he ate; hut; running; lemur; until". The word is from North Saami and it means "hut". If there is a non-arbitrary sound-meaning relation, speakers (regardless of native language) should do better than chance in selecting the meaning, but if it is arbitrary, non-Saami speakers should perform at chance and Saami speakers should guess correctly very often. (You have to exclude people like me who know some Saami but don't actually speak it, and maybe exclude many Norwegians since it's one of those widely-known Saami words in Norway).
One big problem would be keeping track of crosslinguistically polysemous words. For instance, [moto] apparently means "blades of grass, trunks; falcons" in Japanese, "motorcycle" in various Romance languages, "person" in Lingala, "fire" in various other Bantu languages, "eye" in Tiruray. Also, Mongolian [xɛɮ] "language" counts a lot like "hell" to English speakers; Somali [maðaħ] "head" sounds a lot like "mother" and [naag] "woman" sounds a lot like English "nag". In scoring or setting up the stimuli, you'd need to filter out or somehow control for words of one language that sound similar-enough to words of a subjects language that they think it is a word of their language.
That is probably why nobody has done the experiment.
Interestingly, it is so self-evident that the arbitrariness claim is true that nobody has experimentally verified the claim. But it would not be hard to do, if you have access to a captive subject pool. There are many procedures that could be followed, but the basic idea is to take recordings of actual words from various languages, present them (one at a time) to speakers of random languages (take note of what they speak), and have them assign a meaning to the words. Alternatively, give them a set of maybe 5 glosses (in their language), one of which is the correct translation and the others are randomly selected. For instance, a subject is presented with [goahti] and told to choose between "he ate; hut; running; lemur; until". The word is from North Saami and it means "hut". If there is a non-arbitrary sound-meaning relation, speakers (regardless of native language) should do better than chance in selecting the meaning, but if it is arbitrary, non-Saami speakers should perform at chance and Saami speakers should guess correctly very often. (You have to exclude people like me who know some Saami but don't actually speak it, and maybe exclude many Norwegians since it's one of those widely-known Saami words in Norway).
One big problem would be keeping track of crosslinguistically polysemous words. For instance, [moto] apparently means "blades of grass, trunks; falcons" in Japanese, "motorcycle" in various Romance languages, "person" in Lingala, "fire" in various other Bantu languages, "eye" in Tiruray. Also, Mongolian [xɛɮ] "language" counts a lot like "hell" to English speakers; Somali [maðaħ] "head" sounds a lot like "mother" and [naag] "woman" sounds a lot like English "nag". In scoring or setting up the stimuli, you'd need to filter out or somehow control for words of one language that sound similar-enough to words of a subjects language that they think it is a word of their language.
That is probably why nobody has done the experiment.
answered 3 hours ago
user6726user6726
36.7k12471
36.7k12471
You are assuming a universal g here though. There could be per language or maybe even per speaker gs. Different languages encode the same concepts differently (with different words). So they might also have their own g that translates phoneme sequences to word meanings, just like they have their own syntax, phonotactics etc.
– lo tolmencre
2 hours ago
add a comment |
You are assuming a universal g here though. There could be per language or maybe even per speaker gs. Different languages encode the same concepts differently (with different words). So they might also have their own g that translates phoneme sequences to word meanings, just like they have their own syntax, phonotactics etc.
– lo tolmencre
2 hours ago
You are assuming a universal g here though. There could be per language or maybe even per speaker gs. Different languages encode the same concepts differently (with different words). So they might also have their own g that translates phoneme sequences to word meanings, just like they have their own syntax, phonotactics etc.
– lo tolmencre
2 hours ago
You are assuming a universal g here though. There could be per language or maybe even per speaker gs. Different languages encode the same concepts differently (with different words). So they might also have their own g that translates phoneme sequences to word meanings, just like they have their own syntax, phonotactics etc.
– lo tolmencre
2 hours ago
add a comment |
The prove for the claim is trivial. Words on the Swadesh list will show little correlation between meaning and phonetics, save for exceptions like mama. If there is a hidden correlation, then because the relation is more complicated.
EDIT: A weaker Argument would be constrained to a single language of a single speaker. I guess that's more or less what you mean. It's not quite clear what you mean, though. phone, word and set of semantics are not well defined as far as I know. That's in essence the same claim as you attack, if, whatever you refered to, was a response to a failed attempt trying to explain meaning from phonetics. Which would be called inductive reasoning, i.e. experience. The smallest constituent, of speech, the phone, ordered in sequences, is not enough to explain meaning, or to learn language.
add a comment |
The prove for the claim is trivial. Words on the Swadesh list will show little correlation between meaning and phonetics, save for exceptions like mama. If there is a hidden correlation, then because the relation is more complicated.
EDIT: A weaker Argument would be constrained to a single language of a single speaker. I guess that's more or less what you mean. It's not quite clear what you mean, though. phone, word and set of semantics are not well defined as far as I know. That's in essence the same claim as you attack, if, whatever you refered to, was a response to a failed attempt trying to explain meaning from phonetics. Which would be called inductive reasoning, i.e. experience. The smallest constituent, of speech, the phone, ordered in sequences, is not enough to explain meaning, or to learn language.
add a comment |
The prove for the claim is trivial. Words on the Swadesh list will show little correlation between meaning and phonetics, save for exceptions like mama. If there is a hidden correlation, then because the relation is more complicated.
EDIT: A weaker Argument would be constrained to a single language of a single speaker. I guess that's more or less what you mean. It's not quite clear what you mean, though. phone, word and set of semantics are not well defined as far as I know. That's in essence the same claim as you attack, if, whatever you refered to, was a response to a failed attempt trying to explain meaning from phonetics. Which would be called inductive reasoning, i.e. experience. The smallest constituent, of speech, the phone, ordered in sequences, is not enough to explain meaning, or to learn language.
The prove for the claim is trivial. Words on the Swadesh list will show little correlation between meaning and phonetics, save for exceptions like mama. If there is a hidden correlation, then because the relation is more complicated.
EDIT: A weaker Argument would be constrained to a single language of a single speaker. I guess that's more or less what you mean. It's not quite clear what you mean, though. phone, word and set of semantics are not well defined as far as I know. That's in essence the same claim as you attack, if, whatever you refered to, was a response to a failed attempt trying to explain meaning from phonetics. Which would be called inductive reasoning, i.e. experience. The smallest constituent, of speech, the phone, ordered in sequences, is not enough to explain meaning, or to learn language.
edited 2 hours ago
answered 3 hours ago
vectoryvectory
47112
47112
add a comment |
add a comment |
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1
You would need to show that transitive closure. You are making a formal argument, but the claim that you attack is not a formal one, the way you present it. I'll just claim that your premises is potentially flawed, until proven otherwise. That's just not how it works. [cont]
– vectory
2 hours ago
1
You are essentially still trying to understand what they said, who said it and in what context (otherwise give a dog a bone). There's no need to reject the claim as you seem to out of fear that it contradicts your intuition, if you don't know what the claim is.
– vectory
1 hour ago
1
I don't understand what you are saying, sorry.
– lo tolmencre
1 hour ago
1
Transitivity and reflexivity are are properties of relations. A phoneme is not a relation. Uness you somehow redefine the linguistic concept of a phoneme or the mathematical concept of a relation, which you didn't, your "transitive and reflexive closure over the set of phonemes" is just pseudo-formal jabber that can't even possibly exist.
– lemontree♦
1 hour ago
1
You may cast your vote for LaTeX formatting here: linguistics.meta.stackexchange.com/questions/509/…
– lemontree♦
1 hour ago